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Abstract We study the optimal manipulation rules of a public ﬁrm’s objec-
tive function in a mixed duopoly with imperfect product substitutability. We
compare the solutions under quantity and price competition, and the way in
which they are aﬀected by the degree of product substitutability. This allows
us to show that partial privatization, strategic delegation and other speciﬁc
government’s commitments on the objective function of the public manage-
ment can be looked at as special cases of these optimal rules, and to evaluate
the viability of these policies under the two modes of competition. In this
framework, we also discuss the equivalence between manipulation of the ob-
jective function and Stackelberg leadership. JEL Classiﬁcation: D43, L13,
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11 Introduction
The recent literature on mixed oligopolies has highlighted that when a public
ﬁrm competes with private ﬁrms, the welfare enhancing goals pursued by the
government can be better achieved by undertaking a partial privatization
of the publicly-owned ﬁrm (e.g., Matsumura,1998; Matsumura and Kanda,
2005; Fujiwara, 2007). In a game-theoretic framework, the degree of privati-
zation is seen as a government strategic decision, aimed at exploiting at best
the properties of the strategic environment faced by the public ﬁrm.
Indeed, the decision to partially privatize a public ﬁrm amounts to al-
lowing for a change of its objective function, from pure welfare — where the
consumers’ surplus and the proﬁts of all competing ﬁrms enter with the same
weight — to an unbalanced mix of the welfare components, with a greater
weight to its own proﬁts. Therefore, partial privatization can be interpreted
as a credible device through which the government, in a welfare maximiz-
ing perspective, strategically manipulates the decision rules followed by the
public ﬁrms. However, partial privatization is a very speciﬁc kind of manip-
ulation. As put forth by White (2002), it is in the nature of public ﬁrms that
they can in principle be assigned by the policy-maker a much wider set of
objective functions. For example, the manipulation may consist in assigning
to the public ﬁrm the maximization of a generalized welfare function, where
the consumers’ surplus, the rivals’ proﬁts and its own proﬁts enter separately,
with possibly diﬀerent weights.
In this paper we study this general optimal manipulation problem in the
two cases of quantity and price competition. Our reference model is a mixed
duopoly with diﬀerentiated product, which also allows us to capture the inter-
play between the strategy space and the degree of substitutability in shaping
the optimal manipulation rules. In particular, we show that, since the latter
allow for two degrees of freedom, they encompass in principle more spe-
ciﬁc rules (such as the optimal degree of privatization, the optimal strategic
delegation, the optimal pro-consumer composition of the governing board),
through an appropriate deﬁnition of speciﬁc additional constraints on the
relationship among the relevant weights in the generalized welfare function.
Moreover, in order to clarify the diﬀerent systemic properties of the solutions
under quantity and price competition, we explore the case where the set of
optimal manipulations is constrained by a criterion of distance minimization
from pure welfare objectives. This approach allows to point out that under
quantity competition the optimal manipulation rule implies that the welfare
2increase must be obtained through a redistribution from the consumer’s sur-
plus to proﬁts, while under price competition the opposite occurs, with a
reduction of the weight of proﬁts in favour of consumers — which accounts
for diﬀerent policies being supported as implementation of the optimal rule
in the two diﬀerent strategic environments. Finally, we revisit in our mixed
duopoly framework the equivalence between the unilateral adoption of a cred-
ible manipulation of an agent’s objective function, and a time commitment
making that agent a Stackelberg leader (Basu, 1995).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we derive the optimal ma-
nipulation rules under quantity and price competition. In Section 3 we show
how they nest various implementation policies, and discuss their structure
vis à vis the degree of product substitutability. Section 4 brieﬂy comments
on the equivalence between manipulation and Stackelberg leadership, while
some ﬁnal remarks are oﬀered in Section 5.
2 Optimal manipulation
We consider a duopolistic market for a diﬀerentiated product, where the
two varieties are produced by a public ﬁrm and a private ﬁrm (respectively
indexed by 1 and 2). These two ﬁrms share a constant returns technology,
and produce at a constant average and marginal cost c < 1. On the demand
side, there is a continuum of identical consumers (normalized to 1), whose
preferences are given by the following semi-linear utility function:
U (q1,q2;m) = V (q1,q2) + m (1a)











where q1 and q2 are the quantities consumed of the two varieties of the diﬀer-
entiated good, m is a numéraire good exchanged in a perfectly competitive
market, and γ ∈ (0,1) is the parameter measuring product substitutability.
As is well known, semi-linearity implies that the demand functions for the
two varieties can be derived directly by maximization of V and exhibit no
income eﬀect.
On the supply side, we assume that while the government has an ulti-
mate objective in terms of social welfare, deﬁned as the unweighted sum of
consumers’ surplus and overall proﬁts,
W = CS + π1 + π2 (2)
3it has the option of assigning to the public ﬁrm an objective function of the
generalized welfare type:
GW = αCS + βπ1 + δπ2
i.e., a linear combination of the welfare components. The positive coeﬃ-
cients α, β, and δ are set by the government in a strict welfare-maximizing
perspective, prior to the market interaction of the public ﬁrm with the proﬁt-
maximizing private ﬁrm. In this sense, any conﬁguration diﬀerent from
α = β = δ = 1 can be seen as an optimal manipulation of the public
ﬁrm’s objective function, which can actually be realized through an appro-
priate composition of its governing board, or through a system of incentives
to public managers. The behaviour of this market is therefore described by a
two-stage game: at the ﬁrst stage the government strategically deﬁnes GW,
then the public and private ﬁrm compete, with respect to either quantities
or prices, in the product market. We start by investigating the quantity
competition case.
2.1 The two-stage game with quantity decisions
Given preferences deﬁned in (1), the inverse demand functions are:
p1 = 1 − q1 − γq2 (3a)
p2 = 1 − q2 − γq1 (3b)
so that the consumers’ surplus can be written as:












+ γ (q1 + q2)
2￿
Therefore, at the second stage of the game the objective function of the public
ﬁrm is the following generalized welfare function:











+ γ (q1 + q2)
2￿
+
+β (1 − q1 − γq2 − c)q1 + δ(1 − q2 − γq1 − c)q2
Since the public ﬁrm maximizes GW and the private ﬁrm maximizes its




(β (1 − c) + (α − β − δ)γq2)
q2 =
1 − c − γq1
2
4Solving for q1 and q2 yields the equilibrium quantities in terms of the GW
function coeﬃcients:
q1 (α,β,δ) =
(1 − c)(γ (β − α + δ) − 2β)
2(α − 2β) + γ2 (β − α + δ)
(4a)
q2 (α,β,δ) =
(1 − c)(α − β (2 − γ))
2(α − 2β) + γ2 (β − α + δ)
(4b)
At the ﬁrst stage of the game the government chooses the optimal manip-
ulation of the public ﬁrm’s motives. By substituting (4a,b) into the welfare
function (2), W (q1,q2) = CS (q1,q2) + π1 (q1,q2) + π2 (q1,q2), and maximiz-
ing it with respect to α, β, and δ, we obtain a linear homogeneous system of
rank 1, the solution of which is the optimal manipulation rule:
α = B




4 + γ2 − 4γ




4 − 2γ2 − γ
In (5), Bq (γ) is a U-shaped function of γ, tending to 1 as γ tends to zero or
1, with a minimum for γ = 2/3; ∆q (γ) is hump-shaped, tending to zero as γ
tends to zero or 1, with a maximum for γ = 2/3. Moreover, for all γ ∈ (0,1)
Bq (γ) > ∆q (γ) and Bq (γ) + ∆q (γ) < 1.
It is easily seen that all values of α, β, and δ satisfying (5) generate the
following level of production for the two ﬁrms:
q1 =




(1 − γ)(1 − c)
(4 − 3γ2)










2.2 The two-stage game with price decisions
Assume now that the two ﬁrms compete with respect to their prices. The
inverse demand system (3a,b) can be solved to obtain the direct demand
5functions:
q1 =
(1 − γ) − p1 + γp2
1 − γ2 (8a)
q2 =
(1 − γ) − p2 + γp1
1 − γ2 (8b)
By substituting the above expressions into the GW function, the latter can
be expressed in terms of prices as:









1−γ2 (p1 − c) + δ
(1−γ)−p2+γp1
1−γ2 (p2 − c)
The price game between the proﬁt-maximizing private ﬁrm and the GW-
maximizing public ﬁrm has the following general solution:





Following the same procedure described above for the solution of the
ﬁrst stage of the game, we obtain the optimal manipulation rule under price
competition:
α = B




4 − γ3 − 3γ2




4 − γ3 − 3γ2 + γ
In (10) Bp (γ) is a decreasing function of γ ranging from 1 to 0 as γ goes from
0 to 1, while ∆p (γ) is increasing in γ from 0 to 1 along the same the interval,
the two functions crossing at γ = ￿ γ ≈ 0.87. Moreover Bp (γ) + ∆p (γ) > 1
for all γ ∈ (0,1).
Clearly, the equilibrium prices are the same for any triplet (α,β,δ) satis-
fying (10):
p1 =
4c − γ2(1 + 2c) + γ (1 − c)
4 − 3γ2 (11a)
p2 =
(1 − c)(γ3 − 2γ) − (1 + 2c)γ2 + 2(1 + c)







(7 − γ3 − 5γ2 + γ)(1 − c)2
(γ + 1)(4 − 3γ2)
(12)
3 Policy implementations of the optimal rules
The optimal rules derived in the previous section clearly allow a high de-
gree of freedom to the policy maker in assigning diﬀerent weights to the
welfare components. This property has been originally discussed by White
(2002) in a quantity setting framework with homogeneous product, where
the focus is on the possibility that the government exploits these degrees of
freedom to disguise its true objectives through the rules it sets for the pub-
lic management. Our interest is instead in showing how the discussion on
the eﬀectiveness of particular welfare-enhancing unilateral policies (e.g., par-
tial privatization, strategic delegation, etc.) can easily be nested within the
framework of the optimal manipulation rules — a uniﬁed framework, which
accordingly encompasses diﬀerent speciﬁc implementation strategies simply
by imposing additional constraints on the relevant parameters. This anal-
ysis will also allow us to capture the structural features distinguishing the
optimal manipulation rules in the price- as opposed to the quantity-setting.
3.1 Partial privatization
Strategic partial privatization is the welfare-enhancing policy of transforming
the public ﬁrm into a mixed (public—private) ﬁrm, where the government
chooses optimally the share to be sold to the private sector. The idea is
that this mixed ownership structure results into an objective function at the
market stage which is a convex linear combination of welfare and the ﬁrm’s
proﬁts, i.e., a function of the type M = (1 − ψ)(CS + π1 + π2) + ψπ1 =
(1 − ψ)(CS + π2) + π1, where ψ coincides with (or is univocally related to)
the shares held by the private shareholders. It is straightforward to see that,
in terms of the optimal manipulation rule, this amounts to looking for a
solution of the rule under the restrictions α = δ and β = 1 which satisﬁes
α = δ ∈ (0,1).
In the quantity competition case, by solving (5) under the partial privati-
zation restrictions we get the positive value α = δ (= 1 − ψ) = (γ2 + 4 − 4γ)/
(4 − 3γ) < 1, which implies an optimal private share (1 − α) = (1 − γ)γ/
7(4 − 3γ). By contrast, in a price-setting framework, if we solve (10) under
the same restrictions, we get α = δ = (γ2 + 4γ + 4)/ (3γ + 4) > 1, which
explains why under price competition partial privatization is not consistent
with the optimal manipulation rule (Ohnishi, 2010; Ghosh and Mitra, 2008).
3.2 Strategic delegation
Strategic delegation for a public ﬁrm is the welfare-enhancing strategy of del-
egating market decisions to a manager, whose incentive scheme is a convex
linear combination of welfare and another variable of interest for the man-
ager.1 For simplicity, we consider the so-called "relative performance" case,
in which the manager’s variable of interest is the proﬁt diﬀerential, so that
at the market stage the objective function becomes M = φ(CS + π1 + π2)+
(1 − φ)(π1 − π2) = φCS + π1 +(2φ − 1)π2.2 In terms of optimal manipula-
tion, this boils down to looking for a solution of the rule under the restrictions
δ = 2α − 1 and β = 1, which satisﬁes α ∈ (0,1).
In the quantity-setting case, if we solve (5) under these strategic dele-
gation restrictions we obtain α(= φ) = (3γ2 − 6γ + 4)/(2γ2 − 5γ + 4) < 1
and δ = (4γ2 − 7γ + 4)/(2γ2 − 5γ + 4), which proves that the optimal ma-
nipulation rule can be implemented via this kind of strategic delegation.
In the price case, the solution of (10) under the same restrictions deliv-
ers α = (4 − 3γ2 − 2γ)/(γ3 − 3γ2 − 3γ + 4) and δ = (4 − γ3 − 3γ2 − γ)/
(γ3 − 3γ2 − 3γ + 4), such that α ∈ (0,1) with δ > 0 is observed only for
γ > ￿ γ.
3.3 Consumer-oriented management
A third economically meaningful possibility is that the government imple-
ments a welfare-enhancing policy via a consumer-oriented composition of
1Strategic delegation in a private market has been originally discussed by Vickers (1985)
and Fershtman and Judd (1987), who consider the cases in which the variables of interest
for the manager are respectively sales and revenues. The issue of strategic delegation by
a public ﬁrm has been ﬁrstly discussed by Barros (1995) by assuming an incentive scheme
based on the public ﬁrm’s proﬁts and revenues, while the delegation mechanism based only
on proﬁts analyzed by Heywwod and Ye (2009) actually collapses to a partial privatization
scheme.
2In a fully private market, a relative performance based strategic delegation has been
originally studied by Fumas (1992). See also Miller and Pazgal (2001).
8the governing board, which will instruct the managers to behave accord-
ing to an objective function which is a linear convex combination of so-
cial welfare and consumers’ surplus: M = ￿(CS + π1 + π2) + (1 − ρ)CS =
CS + ￿(CS + π1 + π2). In our manipulation rules this amounts to impos-
ing the constraints α = 1 and β = δ, looking for a solution such that
β = δ ∈ (0,1). Solving (5) under these restrictions yields β = δ (= ρ) =
(γ + 2γ2 − 4)/(2γ + γ2 − 4) > 1, implying that under quantity competition
the choice of a consumer-oriented management is not a viable implementation
of the optimal manipulation rule. The opposite applies to the price-setting
case: solving (10) under α = 1 and β = δ gives β = (3γ2 − γ + γ3 − 4)/
(2γ3 − 2γ + 3γ2 − 4) < 1, which makes a consumer-oriented commitment
consistent with the optimal manipulation rule when ﬁrms compete with re-
spect to prices.
3.4 Minimizing the distance from pure welfare maxi-
mization
The implementation of the optimal manipulation rules discussed above re-
sults into imposing a priori speciﬁc constraints on the weights of the general-
ized welfare function. The key properties of these rules, however, can be more
easily captured by imposing a systemic constraint, namely by choosing the
triplets (α,β,δ) satisfying (5) or (10), which minimize the distance from pure
welfare maximization. The rationale for such a choice can be envisaged in the
existence of symmetric manipulation costs for each parameter — which can
be justiﬁed in terms of the political bargaining required for any detachment
from a simple welfare maximization rule. By using a quadratic deﬁnition
of distance, this application of the optimal rule amounts to identifying the
triplets solving the following minimization problems for the quantity-setting
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where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated to each optimal manipulation
rule.
9Figure 1: Distance-minimizing optimal weights under quantity competition























2 − 40γ + 32
￿
with k = (9γ4 − 12γ3 + 13γ2 − 40γ + 32). As shown in Figure 1, the optimal
weights are such that those assigned to the ﬁrms’ proﬁts are both higher
than 1, the highest being the public ﬁrm’s. On the contrary, the consumers’
surplus is assigned a weight lower than 1. These features are preserved for
all values of γ ∈ (0,1).





























2 + 8γ + 32
￿
with h = (3γ6 + 12γ5 + 12γ4 − 22γ3 − 43γ2 + 8γ + 32). As shown in Figure
2, according to this implementation of the optimal rule, for all values of γ
10Figure 2: Distance-minimizing optimal weights under price competition
the consumers’ surplus is given a weight greater than 1, while those of the
proﬁts of both ﬁrms are lower than 1, with δ > β for γ < ￿ γ, which is reversed
beyond this threshold value.
3.5 Comparing manipulation rules under quantity and
price setting
The analysis of the distance minimizing implementation of the manipulation
rules highlights the optimal structure of weights associated to the diﬀerent
modes of competition — which in turn mirrors the properties of equilibrium
in the non-manipulation case. Under quantity competition, distance mini-
mization implies that the weight assigned to both proﬁts is higher than 1
and the weight assigned to the CS is lower than 1. In the standard model
with no manipulation, the reaction function of the public ﬁrm is such that
for, any quantity of the rival, it sets a quantity such that its price equals
marginal cost. This is due to the fact that any marginal decrease in q1 does
not aﬀect, for given q2, the marginal contribution to welfare of its private
competitor, while it increases, provided p1 > c, its own contribution. This
aggressiveness impacts positively on welfare in terms of overall production;
however, in a strategic substitutability environment, it turns out to induce a
marked diﬀerence between the quantities produced by the two ﬁrms, which
11is beneﬁcial in terms of consumers’ surplus, but is indeed welfare detrimen-
tal. At equilibrium there is a potential for increasing overall welfare via an
increase in proﬁts and a reduction of the consumers’ surplus, obtained by
changing the balance between the contribution to welfare of the size of mar-
ket production, and that of the distribution of this production across ﬁrms.
By assigning a higher weight to its own proﬁts, the public ﬁrm reduces its
produced quantity, thus expanding the demand faced by its rival: the quan-
tity diﬀerential shrinks, with an increase in proﬁts for both ﬁrms which more
than compensates the reduction of the consumers’ surplus associated to the
contraction in overall production and its more even distribution. This ex-
plains why in the optimal rule Bq (γ) > ∆q (γ) and Bq (γ)+∆q (γ) < 1, and
why the implementation of the optimal rule may take the features of a partial
privatization, as well as those of a strategic delegation on a relative perfor-
mance base; it also explains why it does not support a consumer-oriented
management. Clearly, the extent of manipulation is larger for intermediate
values of γ: when γ is low the public ﬁrm can only marginally aﬀects the
rival’s decisions, while for high γ near homogeneity of product makes pure
welfare maximization almost optimal.
Under price competition, if a distance minimization criterion is adopted,
the weight of the CS is always greater than 1, while π1 and π2 are both
given a weight lower than 1. With no manipulation, the public ﬁrm sets a
price higher than marginal cost, which allows for a higher price set by the
private ﬁrm: given p2, any marginal decrease in p1 reduces the contribution
of the private ﬁrm to welfare, and this limits the aggressiveness of the public
ﬁrm. The interaction between the two ﬁrms is such that at equilibrium there
is room for an increase in welfare through a redistribution of weights which
favours consumption. The public ﬁrm’s behavior may be moved towards
a generalized eﬃcient pricing, by exploiting strategic complementarity: by
overvaluing the consumers’ surplus and undervaluing its own proﬁts and
the proﬁts of the rival, it lowers its price and pushes the rival in the same
direction. Notice that for γ ≤ ￿ γ the marginal eﬀect on welfare of the public
ﬁrm pricing via its own proﬁts dominates its eﬀect through the rival’s proﬁts,
while the opposite occurs beyond that level. All these observations imply
that the manipulation rule cannot be consistent with partial privatization,
but rather with a consumer-oriented management. Moreover, it explains
why it is consistent with a relative performance oriented strategic delegation
— which favours the public ﬁrm’s own proﬁts over the rivals’ — only for γ > ￿ γ,
which is also the interval where ∆p (γ) > Bp (γ).
124 Optimal manipulation and time commit-
ment
The optimal rules (5) and (10) conﬁrm in our mixed duopoly setups the equiv-
alence between any unilateral credible manipulation of an agent’s objective
function, and the time commitment characterizing sequential market games
(e.g. Basu, 1995; White, 2002). The main implication of this equivalence is
stated in the following remark:
Remark 1 The optimal manipulation rule for a public ﬁrm acting at the
market stage as a Stackelberg leader is equivalent to pure welfare maximiza-
tion, and it generates the same solution as the optimal manipulation rule
for a public ﬁrm playing simultaneously on the market. Therefore, once the
government is allowed to optimally manipulate the public ﬁrm’s objectives,
the solution of the market game is independent of the timing (simultaneous
or sequential with public leadership) of market decisions.
Indeed, by solving the same optimal manipulation problem for a public
ﬁrm acting as a Stackelberg leader in the product market, we obtain the
following optimal rules for the quantity case and the price case, respectively:
α =
3γ3 − 2γ2 + 8 − 8γ
(2 − γ)(4 − 3γ2)
β +
4γ − 4γ2
(2 − γ)(4 − 3γ2)
δ
α =
6γ2 + γ3 − 8
6γ2 − 4γ + 3γ3 − 8
β +
2γ3 − 4γ
6γ2 − 4γ + 3γ3 − 8
δ
These general rules are consistent with α = β = δ = 1 — i.e., with
pure welfare maximization; moreover, by embodying them in the leader’s
and follower’s optimal quantities or prices, and evaluating the correspondent
welfare functions, we obtain again eqts (7) and (12).
5 Conclusions
Starting from the idea that, in a mixed oligopoly, the public ﬁrm’s unilateral
optimal strategic commitment can take the form of assigning to the public
management an objective in terms of a generalized welfare function, in this
paper we have analyzed the structure of this function in the duopoly case
with quantity setting and price setting, under the assumption that products
13are imperfect substitutes. By assuming that the private and public ﬁrms
share the same technology, our results rely exclusively on the properties of
the strategic interaction between ﬁrms, thus ruling out any cost disadvantage
on the public side.
We show that in the quantity-setting case the optimal generalized welfare
function assigned to the public management overvalues the public ﬁrm’s and
the rival’s proﬁts, while it undervalues the consumers’ surplus: the welfare
gain obtained through manipulation of the objective function is obtained
via a redistribution from consumers to proﬁts — which explains why this
optimal structure can be obtained through partial privatization or strate-
gic delegation policies based on relative performance. In the price-setting
case, we obtain an opposite result: the welfare enhancing eﬀects of the opti-
mal manipulation of the objective function are obtained via a redistribution
from proﬁts to consumers, which suggests implementation policies based on
a consumer-oriented management — a framework where partial privatization
is accordingly inconsistent with the optimal manipulation rule.
Finally, in this general optimal manipulation framework we have reformu-
lated the equivalence between adopting any unilateral strategic commitment,
and playing the role of a Stackelberg leader. This equivalence suggests that
when the endogeneization of the timing of decisions supports public leader-
ship, there are no eﬃciency arguments in favour of partial privatization, or
of any other strategic manipulations of the public ﬁrm’s objective function,
consistent with the optimal rule;3 by contrast, strategic manipulation is a
powerful welfare-enhancing instrument when the incentives of the public and
private ﬁrms are to act simultaneously on the market.
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